Abstract There is strong evidence that the order in which response options are presented in surveys significantly affects the answers that respondents provide. According to the theory of survey satisficing, the severity of order effects should increase with task difficulty. However, the tasks provided to respondents in existing studies of response-order effects are generally very simple, making it difficult to evaluate the satisficing hypothesis. Further, evidence from cognitive psychology suggests a completely different mechanism: people are more motivated to persist in completing tasks when they are intricate, challenging, and enriching. I designed survey experiments administered over the Internet consisting of two types of tasks: (1) a complex task in which respondents were asked to rank seven public officials in order of how much they should be blamed for the property damage and loss of life caused by Hurricane Katrina in the city of New Orleans; and (2) a series of simple tasks in which respondents answered items with ordinal response choices on rating scales. I found almost no order effects in the complex task among all educational groups. Conversely, I found significant and substantial order effects in the simple tasks, particularly among low-education respondents. These results suggest that theories of survey satisficing may simplify matters by assuming that satisficing monotonically increases with task difficulty. Moreover, my findings have important implications for questionnaire design, underscoring the importance of randomizing response options.
demonstrate that primacy effects (bias toward selecting earlier response choices) occur in visually presented items whereas recency effects (bias toward selecting later response choices) occur in orally presented items. With respect to ordinal response choices such as rating scales (e.g., response options ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"), Krosnick and Fabrigar's meta-analysis finds consistent evidence of primacy effects across all modes, most likely because people can anticipate the later options from the earlier ones.
1 Hence, there is strong evidence that the order in which response options are presented in surveys significantly affects the answers that respondents provide.
The tasks posed to respondents in these studies are generally very simple. For example, respondents are often asked to select one option among many in a categorical scale (e.g., "What is the most important issue facing the United States today?") or an option from an ordinal rating scale (e.g., "How important are gas prices to you personally?"). I have found no study that simultaneously presents respondents with both simple and complex survey items to ascertain differences in order effects between them.
The main presumption of this approach is that if order effects appear in simple items, then they must surely exist in highly complex items that require a great deal of cognitive effort on the part of respondents. This logic is associated with the theory of survey satisficing (Krosnick and Alwin 1987; Krosnick 1991) , which posits that some respondents minimize effort in responding to surveys and simply provide the appearance of compliance. They sometimes use cognitive shortcuts and do not think about items carefully, thereby affecting data quality through factors such as order effects. According to Krosnick (1991) , the probability of satisficing is positively related to task difficulty and inversely related to respondent ability and motivation. Empirical evidence has been found that respondents with less education and those who are more fatigued satisfice more (Krosnick, Narayan, and Smith 1996; Narayan and Krosnick 1996) . However, task difficulty has been understudied in analyses of the implications of survey satisficing for order effects. Payne (1951) and Schuman and Presser (1996) found that order effects were more pronounced in questions that included more words, syllables, and response alternatives. Similarly, Holbrook et al. (2007) observed a positive relationship between recency effects in telephone surveys and the length of questions and response options. However, changes in these variables do not represent profound increases in task difficulty. One possibility is that if satisficing is observed in simple tasks, then these effects are presumed to be "lower bounds" on the higher potential levels of satisficing presumably present in more difficult tasks.
However, this assumption may neither be theoretically nor empirically sensible. Psychological studies of task complexity have often found that people are more motivated to complete tasks when they are intricate, challenging, and enriching (e.g., Hackman 1969; Taylor 1981; Campbell 1988; Maynard and Hakel 1997) . When the task is simple, respondents may not need to focus intensely on the item in order to complete it. Simplicity may cause respondents to become bored and not expend cognitive effort to carefully consider the item at hand. Conversely, complex tasks may encourage careful thought and introspection precisely because they cannot be easily completed. Items that require several cognitive steps necessitate the full reading of the question and the response options. Hence, order effects and satisficing may be inversely related to task difficulty. It may be that simple tasks are precisely those that are most prone to satisficing, whereas complex tasks may be relatively immune to such problems.
This research note presents evidence from survey experiments administered over the Internet in which respondents completed both a complex ranking task and a set of simple tasks involving straightforward ordinal rating-scale items. In the simple items, significant primacy effects occurred, particularly among the least educated respondents. Conversely, almost no order effects were observed in the complex task in any educational group. These results suggest that theories of survey satisficing may oversimplify matters by assuming that satisficing monotonically increases with task difficulty. Further, these findings underscore that response order randomizations are most needed in low-difficulty tasks, which people might be tempted to complete perfunctorily.
Design
I designed a survey experiment on attitudes toward the government response to Hurricane Katrina in the city of New Orleans. The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN) over the Internet in May 2006, using a nationally representative sample of 397 American adults, recruited via random digit dialing (RDD).
2 Details on respondent recruitment and fielding practices are discussed in Appendix A. All data are weighted by demographics using the methodology described in Appendix A. 3 The questionnaire consisted of two main tasks: (1) a complex task in which respondents were asked to rank seven public officials according to how much they should be blamed for the property damage and loss of life caused by Hurricane Katrina in the city of New Orleans; and (2) a series of simple items in which respondents answered items with ordinal response choices on rating scales. As discussed below, I also analyze data from a second experiment, which included two simple items that more closely mirror the blame attribution judgments required in the complex task.
The survey experiment was principally designed to examine substantive hypotheses about public opinion after Hurricane Katrina, not order effects. Hence, the complex and simple tasks do not simply differ according to difficulty, but also by the format of randomization and the types of response options. Nevertheless, it is evident that one task requires more time and effort than the other. My goal here is to provide initial evidence regarding the relationship between task difficulty and survey satisficing in the form of order effects, thereby encouraging future research to vary complexity more intricately.
COMPLEX TASK
The public officials available for the respondents to rank were Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco (Democrat), Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael Brown (Republican), President George W. Bush (Republican), Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff (Republican), New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin (Democrat), Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu (Democrat), and Louisiana Senator David Vitter (Republican). Respondents were asked: "Who do you think should be blamed the most for the loss of life and property damage in New Orleans that was caused by Hurricane Katrina?," followed by the list of seven officials. After selecting an official, respondents were then asked: "Who do you think should be blamed the second most for the loss of life and property damage in New Orleans that was caused by Hurricane Katrina?," with the official selected first removed from the list. A series of six questions was asked until respondents had ranked all seven officials. Tasks where respondents are required to rank many options have been found to be more cognitively difficult than simpler rating exercises (Alwin and Krosnick 1985) . 4 Two experimental manipulations were embedded in the complex task. First, the order of the officials listed was randomized, allowing us to ascertain whether officials listed higher up were blamed more. Second, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups, each receiving a different format of response options for the ranking task, representing differing information about the seven officials. The first group only received the list of seven proper names without any additional information. The second group received the list of proper names with each official's partisan affiliation. The third group 4. I dropped respondents who either completely skipped or did not complete the ranking task. This accounted for only 7.9 percent of the sample (weighted). I estimated a logistic regression predicting completion with a set of demographic and political variables: party identification, education, age, gender, and race. The coefficients were neither individually not jointly statistically significant at the p = .10 level, providing reassurance that the respondents who did not complete the ranking task were not systematically different from those who did. NOTE.-All data are weighted. N = 361 for "Full Sample," N = 164 for "High School Diploma or Less, " and N = 197 for "Beyond High School." received the list of proper names with each official's job title. The fourth group received the list of proper names with each official's partisan affiliation and job title. 5 Presumably, order effects will be diminished as more information is provided to respondents and they are not making as many "blind guesses." Average blame rankings of each of the seven officials by ballot position and level of education are presented in table 1.
5. The completion rates of respondents in the four information conditions were neither statistically nor substantively different from one another: control group (92.5 percent), "office cue" group (94.1 percent), "party cue" group (88.7 percent), and "both cues" group (93.1 percent). Half of the respondents were assigned to receive the response options in the order listed above. The other half was assigned the reverse order; for example, "not sad at all" listed first and "extremely first" listed last. These kinds of questions have been the focus of the bulk of previous studies of order effects. Compared to the ranking task, these items require less time, focus, and cognitive effort. As mentioned above, the complex and simple items vary across dimensions other than task difficulty. Whereas the complex task requires respondents to report their judgments of external figures, the simple tasks ask respondents to engage in self-assessment. It is possible that introspection encourages satisficing whereas evaluation of government officials is more engaging and consequently motivates attention. To ensure that the differences in the constructs measured did not confound the results, I designed a follow-up survey experiment (also conducted by KN, see Appendix A for details) in February 2007, which included two questions on blame attribution measured on ordinal five-point unipolar rating scales: 6. Half of respondents were told that the official in question was a "Republican appointee" while the other half were told the official was a "Democratic appointee." The results discussed below did not vary by treatment condition.
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Although these items deal with a different substantive area, they resemble the complex task in that they ask about blame toward external political actors. As with the first experiment, half of the respondents were assigned to receive the response options in the order listed above while the other half were assigned to receive the reverse order. Marginal frequencies of responses by condition and level of education for the simple tasks in both experiments are presented in table 2.
Methods
The data from the complex task were generated by asking respondents to rank a set of items. Thus, I employ the rank-ordered logit model, also known as the "exploded logit" model (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981; Chapman and Staelin 1982; Allison and Christakis 1994) . Interested readers can consult the original articles for methodological details; I describe here the intuition behind the model. A basic formal presentation is presented in Appendix B.
The rank-ordered logit model is a generalization of conditional/multinomial logit models, which are used to model discrete choices of individuals selecting among a group of unordered items. The process of ranking is simply an aggregation of these individual choices. Ranked data can be statistically modeled by combining together a set of conditional logit models to create the rank-ordered logit model. 7 To assess primacy effects in the complex task, I estimated rank-ordered logit models predicting blame rankings (with higher numbers indicating less blame) with ballot position (with higher numbers indicating lower positions). If primacy effects are present, then the estimated coefficients should be positive and statistically significant. 8 To assess order effects in the simple tasks, I estimated ordered logistic regressions predicting responses on the rating scales with a dummy variable representing whether the respondent received the "reverse order," meaning that significant, negatively signed coefficients indicate the presence of primacy effects.
Results

COMPLEX TASK
Few order effects were observed in the complex ranking task. I first estimated a rank-ordered logit model predicting blame ranking with a single predictor: a continuous measure of ballot position, ranging from one to seven. The order 7. The rank-ordered logit model is especially appropriate for analyzing these data because the ranking task mirrors the behavioral assumptions underlying the model. As explained above, respondents first chose the most blameworthy official, and then sequentially selected officials they believed to be less and less blameworthy until the ranking task was completed. 8. Estimates were obtained using Stata 9's rologit function. in which officials were listed did not significantly affect blame (β = .0105, p = .52). Further, this effect is not substantively large. Being listed one position higher increases the odds of an official being blamed ahead of another official by only 1.1 percent. 9 Hence, being listed first (as compared to being listed seventh) is associated with a substantively small 6.6 percent increase in the odds. I then predicted blame with six dummy variables representing each of the ballot positions in which an official could have been placed (being listed last is the baseline category), thereby relaxing the assumption of linearity. As shown in model 1 of table 3, I again observed no statistically significant primacy effects. Finally, according to Wald chi-square tests, both models do no better than the null model (with no independent variables) at explaining the blame ranking. Hence, in completing the ranking task, responses were generally unaffected by the order the officials were presented.
Order effects were no stronger among the least-educated respondents. As mentioned above, satisficing theory posits that low-ability respondents should be more prone to order effects. Models 2 and 3 in table 3 include interaction terms between ballot position and dummy variables representing three degree levels (high school, some college, and college). The coefficients associated with the main effect (i.e., not interacted with degree) represent the order effect among respondents in the baseline category-those without a high school diploma. Order effects in the other educational groups are represented by the sum of the main effect and the respective interaction term. In model 2, ballot position is not statistically significant for any group. In model 3, I observe only two significant instances of order effects (out of 24 possible instances), which may be due to chance alone. Among respondents without a high school diploma, 9. Changes in the odds are calculated by exponentiating the coefficient. For instance, the coefficient on ballot position (β = .0105) is interpreted as a 1.011 (e 0.01015 ) times increase in the odds of blaming an official, which represents an approximately 1.1 percent increase in the odds. compared to being listed last, an official listed third is 1.94 times (e 0.66 ) more likely to be blamed than another official (p = .02). Among respondents with some college education, compared to being listed last, an official listed fifth is 1.67 times (e 0.36 + 0.15 ) more likely to be blamed than another official (p = .03). Thus, both high-and low-skilled respondents were generally immune to order effects. I also examined effects among individual officials, including interaction terms between ballot position and dummy variables representing six officials. President Bush provides a convenient baseline because he was, on average, viewed as most to blame and perhaps because of his high name recognition, was least susceptible to primacy effects. The order effect for a given official is represented by the sum of the "Ballot Position" coefficient and the relevant interaction term. As shown in table 4, the only official for whom order significantly affected blame was Senator Landrieu; being listed first (as compared to last) nearly doubles the odds of Landrieu being blamed ahead of Bush (p = .008). Further, the primacy effect was significantly greater for Landrieu than for any other official.
11 Lastly, no significant differences in order effects 11. The familiarity of the officials may have affected the severity of order effects. The position in which a well-known official appears may have little effect on whether they are blamed, whereas a respondent may select the highest listed unknown official to blame among the set of officials that he or she cannot identify. To assess this possibility, I conducted a Lexis-Nexis search of the headlines and lead paragraphs of a set of major newspapers between September 1, 2005 (the day after Katrina lost hurricane strength) and June 1, 2006 (the day after the survey was fully fielded) using the search terms "Hurricane Katrina" and the official's name. This content analysis revealed that the ranking of the officials in terms of media coverage was: Bush (614 articles), Nagin (566), Brown (315), Blanco (307), Chertoff (208), Landrieu (117), and Vitter (79). Hence, the order effects observed for Landrieu may have been due to the senator's lack of media coverage. Although I did not observe a significant effect for Vitter, who was also not covered extensively.
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were observed for any other pair of officials. 12 Therefore, for all but one official, primacy effects were not present in the complex task.
I next considered whether providing information cues to respondents mitigated order effects. As shown in table 5, I estimated rank-ordered logit models predicting blame rankings with interactions between ballot position and the type of cue provided. To avoid including three-way interaction terms, the models were estimated separately for each of the four degree levels, as well as for the full sample. The coefficients on "Ballot Position" represent the order effects for respondents who received no information cues, the group in which we expect effects to be the greatest. However, primacy effects were not observed in any education category. Indeed, the only significant order effect observed (out of the 16 estimated coefficients) was a recency effect among respondents with some college education in the party cue condition (p = .04), which may be due to chance alone. Substantively, the estimated effect of moving from the seventh position to the first position corresponds to a 68 percent decrease (e −6 * (0.063−0.149) ) in the odds of blaming one official ahead of another. Hence, the results presented above are not confounded by how much information about the officials respondents received.
SIMPLE TASK
On the other hand, order effects were present in the simple tasks, particularly among low-education respondents. As mentioned above, I estimated ordered logistic regressions predicting responses on the rating scales with a dummy variable representing whether the respondent received the "reverse order," meaning that significant, negatively signed coefficients indicate the presence of order effects. As seen in model 1 in table 6, for six of the seven rating-scale items, respondents were more likely to select response options listed near the top and less likely to select response options listed toward the bottom. This was true for the items measuring constructs related to self-assessment as well as those dealing with blame attribution.
Further, as shown in model 2 (which includes interaction terms between the order dummy and level of education), primacy effects were strongest among the least educated respondents. For six of the seven rating scales (including the two blame attribution items), respondents with less than a high school education exhibited significant order effects (as indicated by the coefficients on "Reverse Order"). Moreover, the positive signs on the interaction terms indicate that order effects diminish as cognitive sophistication increases. For three items from the Katrina study (interest, attention to media coverage, sadness), respondents with high school educations also exhibited statistically significant order effects (p < .10, two-tailed). This was also the case 12. I estimated separate models for Republican and Democratic respondents and the results were statistically and substantively similar. Among both groups of partisans, Landrieu is the only official for whom significant primacy effects were observed. for respondents with some college education, but only for the interest item. Respondents possessing college degrees did not exhibit significant order effects in any case. As shown in table 2, these effects are substantively in addition to statistically significant. For instance, when "extremely interested" is listed first, 31.2 percent of low education respondents selected that option. Conversely, when that option is listed last, only 10.3 percent of low education respondents selected it. Among respondents with more than a high school education, the difference is much narrower: 27.7 percent selected "extremely interested" when it was selected first and 22.6 percent selected it when it was presented last.
These results suggest that satisficing was quite prevalent among the simple tasks for low-education respondents, confirming the previous studies on response order described above. Consistent with theoretical expectations, high-ability respondents were less likely to satisfice. However, contrary to existing theory, satisficing among those with lower education backgrounds was higher when the task was easier. This suggests that task difficulty may in fact encourage closer attention to the questionnaire because respondents are forced to read every response option to satisfactorily complete the item.
Discussion
Satisficing theory has enhanced our understanding of survey methodology and questionnaire design. However, the results presented in this note raise questions about the presumed relationship between task difficulty and satisficing. In these data, order effects were observed in the simple, not the complex, tasks. Clearly, the ranking task employed in this experiment was very difficult and required great cognitive effort on the part of respondents. However, it is precisely this type of item that tests the limits of satisficing theory. These findings suggest that the relationship between task difficulty and satisficing is not monotonic.
There are, of course, limits to the analyses presented here. First, the findings may have limited generalizability to other modes of interviewing, such as the telephone. The ranking exercise administered in this study would not be practically feasible in telephone surveys, because respondents may not be able to process lengthy oral instructions. Hence, task difficulty cannot be easily varied over the telephone, precluding the testing of this particular aspect of satisficing theory. Nonetheless, some telephone surveys have asked respondents to rank a limited number of options, thereby producing some variability in difficulty. Second, as discussed above, the two tasks differ in features other than complexity. Although I did observe significant and substantial order effects in simple tasks dealing with blame attribution, future work can more precisely examine different gradations of task complexity while ensuring that items are similar across all other dimensions. 
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These findings may be of benefit to survey researchers in the process of designing questionnaires. Contrary to the prescriptions of satisficing theory, and instead drawing on work in cognitive psychology, I suggest that increasing the task-related complexity of items may in fact enhance data quality by forcing respondents to pay more attention to the items. Although I do not suggest that tasks be made unnecessarily difficult on purpose, researchers ought not shy away from needed complexities if they are crucial to measuring certain constructs. Second, researchers may be tempted not to randomize response options for simple items (e.g., those that measure straightforward constructs or have few response choices). Consistent with prior research, I have found that the order in which response options are presented affects the answers respondents choose for simple items. Somewhat counterintuitive, I did not observe order effects for the more difficult tasks that are understudied by methodological research. Although these results indicate an inverse relationship between item complexity and satisficing, future research involving different tasks and modes may reveal more intricate nonlinearities. These findings can serve as a building block for future theoretical examinations of survey response, assisting practitioners in designing better questionnaires.
Appendix B: Formal Presentation of the Rank-Ordered Logit Model
Formally, we assume that the data are derived from a random utility model, where BR ij represents the latent blame respondent i has for official j (out of J officials). We observe Y ij , which is the blame ranking respondent i assigns to official j. 13 Although BR ij is unobserved, we assume that respondent i ranks official j more blameworthy than official k if BR ij > BR ik . Each BR ij is modeled as having a systematic component (μ ij ) and a random component (ε ij ). For example, for model (2) in table 3:
BR ij = β 1 P ij + β 2 (P ij × H i ) + β 3 (P ij × S i ) + β 4 (P ij × C i ) + ε ij (B.1)
where P ij represents the ballot position of official j that was randomly assigned to respondent i, H i is a dummy variable representing whether the individual respondent i received a high school diploma, S i is a dummy variable representing whether the individual respondent i received some college education, C i is a dummy variable representing whether the individual respondent i received a college degree, and ε i represents stochastic error that is distributed doubleexponential (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981) . 14 The education dummies are indexed by respondent because they do not vary by official. The model implies the likelihood, L i , of a respondent ranking official k as more blameworthy than official j. As shown in equation (B.2), the likelihood of the rank-ordered logit model is simply the product of the likelihoods of individual conditional logit models.
15
Stata 9's internally developed rank-ordered logistic regression function (rologit) is implemented based on Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981) .
13. I coded blame to lie between 1 (most blame) and 7 (least blame). However, the rank-ordered logit model is not invariant to a reversal in the coding of the rankings. Consequently, I reestimated all models with a reversed coding of blame and the results were statistically and substantively similar to those reported in this paper. 14. I do not include the individual characteristics H i , S i , and C i because they do not vary across choices within individuals. 15. DeShazo and Fermo (2002) 
